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The European Succession Regulation and
the Arbitration of Trust Disputes
S.I. Strong
ABSTRACT: Over the last few decades, U.S. citizens have become
increasingly mobile, with significant numbers of individuals living, working,
and investing abroad. Estate planning has become equally international,
generating ever-larger numbers of cross-border succession cases. While these
sorts of developments are welcome, they require lawyers to appreciate and
anticipate the various ways that the laws of different jurisdictions can
interact.
One of the most important recent developments in international succession
law comes out of the European Union. While the European Succession
Regulation may initially appear applicable only to nationals ofE. U. Member
States, U.S. citizens can also be afjected by its provisions. This Article analyzes
the interaction between the Regulation and trust arbitration, which has
become increasingly popular in various U.S. and foreign jurisdictions. In so
doing, the Article discusses how trust arbitration furthers the goals of the
Regulation and how individual provisions in the Regulation may support or
restrict the possibility of arbitration of trust-related disputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, trust arbitration has gained a significant foothold,
both domestically and internationally.: Not only have an increasing number
of jurisdictions adopted legislation explicitly permitting the arbitration of
trust disputes, but case law and commentary have demonstrated how trust
arbitration can proceed even in the absence of statutory authorization.2 Many
of these developments can be traced to the increased appreciation byjudges,
lawyers, and others in the trust industry of (1) the differences between trust
arbitration and the more problematic forms of arbitration (most notably
consumer arbitration); and (2) the benefits of arbitration in matters involving
internal trust disputes, meaning disputes between beneficiaries or between
beneficiaries and the trustee.3
As encouraging as these developments may be, some issues remain
unclear. Perhaps the most important matter to consider involves the
applicability of European Union ("E.U.") Regulation 650/2012 on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and
Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in Matters of
Succession and on the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession
("Regulation") to efforts to arbitrate disputes involving trusts.4 As a matter of
European law, the Regulation is binding on most E.U. Member States in its
existing form, without any need for domestic implementation.5
Because the Regulation is meant to harmonize the rising incidence of
cross-border successions within the E.U., the Regulation may at first glance
1. See generally ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (SI. Strong ed., 2o16) (discussing various issues involving arbitration of trust disputes);
GrantJones & Peter Pexton, ADRAND TRUSTS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION OF TRUST DISPUTES (2 015) (same).
2. See ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note i, at 143-432 (discussing trust arbitration as a matter of national law); SI. Strong,
Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1157, 1195-1245
(2o12) (outlining theoretical obstacles to trust arbitration).
3. SeeStrong, supranote 2, at 1161-64, 1181-87; S.I. Strong, TheFuture of TrustArbitration:
Quo Vadis ?, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note i, at 531, 543 n.6o; see also infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing the
benefits of arbitration in the trust context).
4. See Council Regulation 65o/2012, 2012 OJ. (L 2o) 107.
5. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.
288, 2o12 o.J. (C 326) 47, 171-72.
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appear relevant only to parties and practitioners in E.U. Member States. 6
However, experts in private international law accept that E.U. legislation
can-and increasingly does-have external effects on individuals outside the
E.U.7 The Regulation is no exception and can have a surprising effect on the
estate plans of non-E.U. nationals, including U.S. citizens, who reside in the
E.U. or who hold property in the E.U. at the time of their death.
The Regulation is extremely far-reaching, and it is impossible to conduct
a comprehensive analysis of the entire document in the current Article. This
discussion therefore focuses only on the Regulation's applicability to trust
arbitration. The Article begins in Section II with a brief introduction to the
current status of trust arbitration around the world before turning to the
Regulation itself in Section III. After analyzing the most important provisions
of the Regulation, the discussion concludes in Section IV with some forward-
looking observations.
II. TRUST ARBITRATION AROUND THE WORLD
Although trust arbitration raises a number of theoretical and practical
issues not seen in other types of arbitration, the procedure is developing at a
rapid rate around the world.8 At the time of writing, five U.S. states (Arizona,
Florida, Missouri, New Hampshire, and South Dakota) have adopted statutes
explicitly recognizing the validity of an arbitration provision found in a trust.9
6. See Eva Lein, A Further Step Towards a European Code of Private International Law: The
Commission Proposalfora Regulation on Succession, ii Y.B. PRIV. INT'L L. 107, 109 (2009) (providing
statistics); Walter Pintens, Need and Opportunity of Convergence in European Succession Laws, in THE
LAW OF SUCCESSION: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 5, 5 (Miriam Anderson & Esther Arroyo i
Amayuelas eds., 2O i). An increasing number of U.S. citizens now live, work, or invest abroad.
See SI. Strong, International Implications of the Will as an Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract, 68
FLA. L. REV. F. 1, 1-2 (2o16).
7. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (20 12); Etienne Pataut,
The External Dimension of Private International Family Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THEEU L107, 109-11 (Marise Cremona & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2o16) (discussing
the Brussels effect in succession law).
8. See Strong, supra note 2, at i6o. It is impossible to describe the benefits of and
challenges facing trust arbitration in the current Article, but further reading is available. See
generally ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note i (discussing various issues involving arbitration of trust disputes); SI. Strong, Empowering
Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a
Trust, 47 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 275 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Language] (discussing issues
relating to the drafting of arbitration provisions in trusts); SI. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of
Internal Trust Disputes: Improving Arbitrability and Enforceability Through Proper Procedural Choices,
28 ARB. INT'L 591 (2o12) [hereinafter Strong, Arbitrability] (discussing procedures associated
with arbitration of internal trust disputes).
9. SeeARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2o12); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (West 2017);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.2-205(1) (West 2o1 7 ); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5 64 -B:1-111A (West 2o18);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-54 (Supp. 2017).
2018] 2207
IOWA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 103:2205
Support for trust arbitration also exists in the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") ,o
which has been adopted in whole or in part by 31 U.S. states and the District
of Columbia, 11 and in the laws of two other states (Idaho and Washington), 12
although these provisions are somewhat unclear as to who-the settlor or the
trustee-has the authority to choose arbitration as a means of resolving
disputes.13 Several state courts have also adopted pro-arbitration positions,
even in the absence of legislation explicitly authorizing trust arbitration. 14
Trust arbitration has also been embraced in other countries. Guernsey
and the Bahamas have both adopted legislation explicitly authorizing trust
arbitration, with other common lawjurisdictions, most notably New Zealand,
poised to follow suit. 15 Australia may be moving toward judicial recognition of
trust arbitration, similar to what has occurred in Texas.16 A number of civil
law countries, most notably Malta and Liechtenstein, have also shown support
for arbitration of trusts or their civil-law analogues.17 Similar provisions are
10. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 11 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N amended 2010) (describing
requirements for a valid trust arbitration agreement).
11. Acts: Trust Code, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title-
Trust%2oCode (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
12. See IDAHO CODE §§ 15-8-lol, 15-8-1o3 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.96A.olo,
11.96A.o3o (2016).
13. See Strong, supra note 2, at 1189-9o.
14. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3 d 840, 846 (Tex. 2013); see also Mary F. Radford, Trust
Arbitration in the United States Courts, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 175, 181-96; Strong, supra note 2, at 1207, 1245 (discussing
case law in other states, including New York, Michigan, Texas, and California). But see Shri Vimal
Kishor Shah v.Jayesh Dinesh Shah, (2016) Civil Appeal No. 8164 58, 6i (India), http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/supremecourt/2013/10322/10322 2013 Judgement 17-Aug-2o16.pdf
(finding by the Supreme Court of India that "there exists an implied bar of exclusion of
applicability of' India's arbitration statute for matters arising under the Trust Act and holding
that trust disputes are non-arbitrable).
15. See Arbitration Amendment Bill 2017, cl. 4 (N.Z.) (proposing a new section ioAin the
Arbitration Act 1996 (N.Z.) that would "deem[]" arbitration clauses in trusts to be arbitration
agreements under the 1996 Act and would give arbitrators the ability to appoint representatives
empowered to act for minor, unborn or unascertained beneficiaries); David Brownbill, Arbitration
of TrustDisputes Under the Bahamas Trustee Act 1998, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 313, 313; Paul Buckle, Trust Arbitration in
Guernsey, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note i, at 289, 289; Strong, supra note 3, at 531, 533.
i6. See Fitzpatrick v Emerald Grain Pty. Ltd. [2017] WASC 2o6, at [9o]-[91], [99] (Austl.)
(allowing arbitration of trust disputes even over the objection of one of the parties); Rinehart v Welker
[2012] NSWCA 95, at [173]-[177] (Court of Appeal NSW) (Austl.) (Bathurst, CJ.) (allowing
arbitration of trust dispute when all the parties and beneficiaries agreed); see also supra note 14.
17. See Johannes Gasser & Ren6 Saurer, Trust Arbitration in Liechtenstein and Austria, in
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at
4o8, 413; Edgardo Mufnoz & Sofia Llamas, Arbitration of Mexican Trust Disputes: A Couple Made for
Each Other? 23 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 81-83 (2015); Georg von Segesser & Katherine
Bell, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 35 ASA BULL. 10, 35 (2017). Much has been written about the
common law origins of trusts and the efforts of various civil lawjurisdictions to adopt analogous
mechanisms. See Alexandra Braun, The Framing ofa European Law of Trusts, in THE WORLDS OF THE
2208
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found in Panama and Paraguay, although the devices in these countries are
primarily commercial rather than testamentary in nature." Switzerland does
not contemplate trust arbitration per se (since Swiss law does not provide for
trusts) but appears capable of enforcing awards arising out of arbitration of
foreign trusts pursuant to the Swiss statute on private international law.19
Although commentators have also argued that trust arbitration falls within the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), which is
the primary means of enforcing arbitral awards across national borders. 2
TRUST 277, 279-84 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013) (discussing civil law trust equivalents in Europe);
Madeleine Carfin Cumyn, Reflections Regarding the Diversity of Ways in Mhich the Trust Has Been
Received or Adapted in Civil Law Countries, in RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 6,
14-2o (Lionel Smith ed., 2o12); Ben McFarlane, The Trust and Its Civilian Analogues, in THE
WORLDS OF THE TRUST, supra, at 512, 512-23. The Maltese Arbitration Act reads:
(2) It shall be lawful for a settlor of a trust to insert an arbitration clause in a deed
of trust and such clause shall be binding on all trustees, protectors and ary
beneficiaries under the trust in relation to matters arising under or in relation to the
trust.
(3) In the cases referred to in the preceding subarticles, the right of a party to seek
directions of the Court of voluntaryjurisdiction in terms of the Trusts and Trustees
Act shall not be limited by ary such clause and notwithstanding the provisions of this
Act, the said Court shall not be bound to stay proceedings in terms of article 15 (3)
or otherwise, but shall enjoy a discretion to do so until such time as it determines
that the matter is of a contentious nature, in which case it shall stay the proceedings
and shall refer the parties to arbitration.
Arbitration Act 1996, ch. 387, § 15A (Malta). The Liechtenstein law has been translated as:
Trusts pursuant to foreign law may be created in Liechtenstein provided (1) that as
far as necessary in the individual case the relationship between settlor, trustee and
beneficiaries is subject to the trust regulations of the foreign law which must be
included in detail in the trust instrument and that the relationship between the Trust
and third parties shall be subject to Liechtenstein law; (2) that a mandatory court of
arbitration shall decide disputes between settlor, trustee and beneficiary.
von Segesser & Bell, supra, at 35 r1-94.
18. See Rafael Ibarra Garza, (Un)enforceability of Trust Arbitration Clauses in Civil and Common
Law, 22 TR. & TRUSTEES 759, 765 (2 o 16); see also Dante Figueroa, CivilLaw Trusts in Latin America:
Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 701, 704-07 (2007) (suggesting Latin American trusts ("fideicomisos") are
primarily commercial and contractual in nature); SI. Strong, Congress and Commercial Trusts:
Dealing with Diversity Jurisdiction Post-Americold, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1O21, 1O89-91 (2017)
(distinguishing commercial and testamentary trusts under U.S. law); Strong, supra note 2, at
12o9-19 (noting fewer problems with arbitration in cases where trusts are considered contractual
in nature).
19. See Tina Wfistemain & Roman Huber, Trust Arbitration in Switzerland, in ARBITRATION OF
TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 383, 386, 406-o7.
20. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. 1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention]; Sarah Ganz, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Arising from an Internal Trust
Arbitration: Issues Under the New York Convention, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 494, 494-95; Margaret L. Moses, International
Enforcement of an Arbitration Provision in a Trust: Questions Involving the New York Conventio, in
IOWA LAWREVIEW
III. THE REGULATION
The Regulation is a complex document with numerous intersecting
provisions. While it is impossible to provide a comprehensive analysis of all
trust-related issues, the following discussion provides an introduction to the
Regulation as a whole and highlights some of the more critical concerns for
trust arbitration.
A. THE REGULA TION AND PRiVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw
In many ways, the Regulation, which came into effect in 25 E.U. Member
States on August 17, 20 15,21 is a marvel of private international law, achieving
through procedural law what might have been impossible at the substantive
level.22 In essence, the Regulation seeks to facilitate "[t]he proper functioning
of the internal market.., by removing the obstacles to the free movement of
persons who currently face difficulties in asserting their rights in the context
of a succession having cross-border implications."23 This goal is achieved
through the creation of a single, pan-European system of rules regarding
jurisdiction, conflict of laws and recognition of judgments in the area of
succession law. 24
The structural similarity of the Regulation to other E.U. regulations on
jurisdiction and judgments25 has led the succession regulation to sometimes
be referred to as "Brussels IV."26 While the classification of the Regulation as
a Brussels-style enactment carries no legal ramifications, commentators have
noted that the E.U. has a far-reaching "tendency to use jurisdiction [as
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 467,
493; Strong, supra note 2, at 1213-18; Wfisteinain & Huber, supra note 19, at 405-06. Issues
relating to trusts have also arisen in the context of investment arbitration, which is a treaty-based
form of dispute resolution. SeeOdysseas G. Repousis, The Use of Trusts in Investment Arbitration 3 4 ARB.
INT'L (forthcomingJune 2o18), available athttps://doi.org/10.1093/arbirit/aiyol5.
21. See Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 83(1), 2012 OJ. (L 2o) 107, 133. The
applicability of the Regulation in three additional Member States (Ireland, Denmark and the
United Kingdom) is questionable. See id. at i 16 82-83.
22. See Andrea Bonomi, Choice-of-Law Aspects of the Future EC Regulation in Matters of
Succession-A First Glance at the Commission's Proposal, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw: LIBERAMICORUM KURT SIEHR 157, 166 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds.,
2oo). A focus on procedural law is necessary because the E.U. does not have competence to
legislate on substantive matters relating to succession law. See Lein, supra note 6, at i 1 1.
23. Council Regulation 65o/2012, 7, 2012 O.J. at 107.
24. See id. 8 (ioting "the creation of a European Certificate of Succession").
25. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, arts. 4-35, 2o12 OJ. (L 351) 1, 7-13; Council
Regulation 2201/2003, arts. 3-20, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1, 5-9; Council Regulation 44/2001,
arts. 2-31, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 3-10.
26. SeeRichard Frimson, Brussels IV. The Problems of Trusts and Characterisation in the CivilLaw,
3 PRIV. CLIENT BUS. 170, 170 (2007). But see Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Choice-of-Court
Agreement, in THE EU SUCCESSION REGULATION: A COMMENTARY 149, 151 (Alforiso-Luis Calvo
Caravaca et al. eds., 2o16) (noting that settlors of trusts have wider authority to choose a forum
under the Brussels I Regulation and Brussels I Recast than under the Regulation); Pataut, supra
note 7, at 119-2o (noting differences between the Regulation and Brussels I and II).
1VOI. 103:22052210
EUROPEAN SUCCESSION REGULATION
outlined in the various Brussels regulations] as a means to 'defend' European
substantive standards against different . . . international standards."27
Although there is no evidence yet of judicial protectionism arising in cases
arising under the Regulation, such a phenomenon could occur in cases
involving trust arbitration given that some Member States are highly
protective of succession rights and quietly skeptical about the value of non-
judicial forms of dispute resolution.2
Commentary regarding the Regulation has been largely positive, since
the Regulation grants a welcome-and in some cases, revolutionary-degree
of deference to testator autonomy.2 9 However, the Regulation also creates
some ambiguity, most notably with respect to the ability of the parties to
engage in various forms of non-judicial dispute resolution.3 This issue is
bound to be tested in the coming months and years, given the ever-increasing
reliance on alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") in the E.U.;31 the
extremely protective attitude in many E.U. Member States regarding
succession rights and forced heirship;32 and the recognition that questions of
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of decisions
have the potential to affect matters of substantive concern.33
B. JURISDICTION
Although some people might think that the Regulation applies only to
E.U. nationals, jurisdiction under the Regulation is based on "habitual[]
residen[ce]," which means that the estate of any person, even a non-E.U.
national, who is habitually resident in the E.U. at the time of his or her death
27. Marise Cremona & Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THE EU 1, 4-5 (Marise Cremona & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2o16); see also Hans-W.
Micklitz, The Internal Versus the External Dimension ofEuropean Private Law: A Conceptual Design and
a Research Agenda, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EU, supra, at 9, 24.
28. See Silvia Barona Vilar & Carlos Esplugues Mota, ADR Mechanisms and Their Incorporation
into Global Justice in the Twenty First Century: Some Concepts and Trends, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
ADR 1, 1o (Carlos Esplugues & Silvia Barona eds., 2014); Michael W. Galligan, US Expatriate
Persons and Property Owners, the European Union Succession Regulation and the Choice of New York Law,
23 TR. & TRUSTEES 325, 326 (2 017); Debbie De Girolamo, Rhetoric and CivilJustice: A Commentary
on the Promotion of Mediation Without Conviction in England and Wales, 35 CIV. JUST. Q. 162, 163
(2o 16); Adam S. Hofri-Wiriogradow, TrustJurisdiction Clauses: Their Proper Ambit, 13 J. PRV. INT'L
L. 519, 526-27 (2017); Lein, supra note 6, at 132.
29. See Bonomi, supranote 22, at i66.
30. See Mathias Weller, Definitions, in THE EU SUCCESSION REGULATION: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 26, at 1 14, 122-23.
31. See EWALD A. FILLER, COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN EUROPE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE
USER EXPERIENCE 413-14 (20 12); Barona Vilar & Esplugues Mota, supra note 28, at 40.
32. See Galligan, supra note 28; Lein, supra note 6, at 11 o.
33. See Andrea Bonomi, Testamentary Freedom or Forced Heirship? Balancing Party Autonomy and
the Protection of Family Members, in THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6,
at 25, 28 (" [I] t is well known and generally accepted that the solutions of conflict of laws problems




will be subject to the principles and procedures described in the Regulation.34
The Regulation also establishes jurisdiction in the E.U. in cases where the law
of a Member State was chosen to govern the succession or where certain
property exists in the E.U., even if the decedent was not resident in the E.U.
at the time of his or her death.35 As a result, estate planners outside the E.U.
must consider the possible applicability of the Regulation in cases where
clients own property located in the E.U., maintain their habitual residence in
the E.U., or intend to engage in those activities.
C. SCOPE
The Regulation addresses a variety of testamentary instruments,
including wills, as well as intestate succession.36 However, only a small subset
of trust-related disputes fall within the scope of the instrument, at least at first
glance.37 For example, according to the Regulation, "[q] uestions relating to
the creation, administration and dissolution of trusts [are] excluded from the
scope of [the] Regulation."3s However, the Regulation explicitly states that
"[t]his should not be understood as a general exclusion of trusts."39 Instead,
"[w]here a trust is created under a will or under statute in connection with
intestate succession the law applicable to the succession under this Regulation
should apply with respect to the devolution of the assets and the
determination of the beneficiaries." 40 Matthias Weller interprets this language
as meaning that
[w] here a trust is created under a will or by operation of the law as a
legal consequence of intestate succession, the applicable succession
law should apply with respect to the devolution of the assets and the
determination of the beneficiaries. The same applies to trusts by
judicial act. Thus, [the Regulation] only excludes trusts created
voluntarily by a legal act of the settlor .... Further, even in respect
to voluntarily created trusts succession law should remain applicable
for issues other than the creation, administration and dissolution of
trusts such as the interpretation of the disposition upon death by the
34. SeeCouncil Regulation 650/2012, art. 16, 2o12 0.J. (L 2o) 107, 119. The concept of
"habitual residence" is subject to a variety of considerations and exceptions. See id. 23-25, at lo9;
Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca, General Jurisdiction, in THE EU SUCCESSION REGULATION: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 127, 127-30.
35. SeeCouncil Regulation 650/2012, arts. 7, 10, 2012 0J. at 118-19; Galligan, supra note
28, at 326. Courts in E.U. Member States may also accept jurisdiction based on appearance or
need (forum necessitatis), although the latter is reserved for extreme cases. See Council Regulation
65o/2012, arts. 9, 11, 2o12 0.J. at 118, 119.
36. SeeCouncil Regulation 65o/2012
, 
arts. 1, 3(1), 2012 OJ. at 1 16-17.
37. Id. 13, at io8; see also Matthias Weller, Scope, in THE EU SUCCESSION REGULATION: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 73, 102 (describing how the term "trust" is to be construed).





settlor or the identification of the beneficiaries. Even the creation by
testamentary disposition as such may be seen as covered by
succession law.41
This analysis suggests that questions relating to the arbitration of trust
disputes mayvery well be covered by the Regulation's choice of law provisions,
as well as by provisions relating to jurisdiction and recognition ofjudgments.
Under Weller's interpretation, the Regulation could govern provisions found
in both voluntary and judicially created trusts requiring the arbitration of
trust-related disputes as long as the disputes involved appropriate issues "such
as the interpretation of the disposition upon death by the settlor or the
identification of the beneficiaries."42
At this point, it is unclear how questions of jurisdiction, applicable law,
and recognition of judgments will be handled in cases falling outside the
Regulation.43 In some cases, recourse may be had to the Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition ("Hague Trust
Convention"), which allows settlors to choose the law governing their trusts,
subject to certain mandatory rules of law and public policy.44 Although no
case has tested the issue yet, commentators suggest that the Hague Trust
Convention is applicable to questions involving trust arbitration.45
Unfortunately, the Hague Trust Convention has not yet been widely
adopted,46 which means that issues falling outside the Regulation are more
likely to be determined by reference to national rules on choice of governing
law.47 The problem with this approach, at least within the European Union, is
that national laws are normally pre-empted by European regulations.4
According to Weller, if the national rules are effectively erased, then
either ad-hoc rules by case law will have to be applied or the
[Regulation] could be applied by analogy. However, the applicable
succession law may limit the testamentary dispositions to certain
types of dispositions (numerus clausus) such as in Germany, France
41. Weller, supra note 37 ("For example, trusts emerging after the death of one of two
testators who established a mutual will are not covered by the exception, at least not 'with respect
to the devolution of the assets."' (footnotes omitted)).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1o 3 .
44. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition arts. 6-7, 16,
i8,July 1, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1389 (applying the law of the state with the closest connection to the
trust if no law is explicitly chosen); see also Weller, supra note 37, at 103.
45. See Georg von Segesser, Arbitrating TrustDisputes: Effect of the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 435, 466.
46. See 3o: Convention of i July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition,
HCCH, https://www.hcch.riet/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid-59 (last updated
Sept. 19, 2017) (ioting the United States has signed but not ratified the instrument).




or Spain. In that case, it appears adequate either to infer from the
disposition an implied choice of law or to reinterpret the testator's
will as aiming at the closest equivalent to a trust such as an execution
of the will (Testamentsvollstreckung; nomination d'un ex&uteur
testamentaire). Whether such an interpretation is possible is a
question of the interpretation of the will in its entirety and as such
governed by the succession law as determined according to the
[Regulation] .49
D. APPLICABLE LAw
The Regulation adopts a relatively straightforward approach to questions
relating to choice of law and seeks to create a unity between the forum and
applicable law.5o As a general rule, matters that are subject to the Regulation
are governed by the law of the decedent's habitual residence5i and heard in
that particular forum.52 However, the Regulation allows a limited amount of
autonomywith respect to both choice of law and choice of forum, as discussed
in this and the following subsection.53
Although the goal of unity between the applicable law and the forum
might initially suggest that matters arising under the Regulation may only be
governed by the law of the various Member States,54 the Regulation
specifically contemplates the possibility that foreign law, including U.S. law,
could control.55 Although any attempt by a testator to choose a law other than
the state of his or her habitual residence is somewhat constrained, in that the
choice must refer to the decedent's "succession as a whole" and may only refer
to the law of the decedent's nationality,56 the Regulation indicates that the
chosen law "should be valid even if the chosen law does not provide for a
choice of law in matters of succession."57 This latter provision may prove quite
49. Id. at 104 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 103 (noting that some techniques may lead
to different governing law for trusts than is indicated under the Regulation).
50. See Maria Alvarez Torn6, Key Points on the Determination of International Jurisdiction in the
New EURegulation on Succession and Wills, 14 Y.B. PR1V. INT'L L. 409, 412 (2013).
51. SeeCouncil Regulation 650/2012, art. 21(1), 2o12 0.J. (L 2o1) 107, 12o; see also id. art.
21 (2), at 12o (ioting that such rule shall apply unless "it is clear from all the circumstances of
the case that, at the time of death, the deceased was manifestly more closely connected with a
State other than the State whose law would be applicable under paragraph i
52. See id. art. 4, at i18.
53. See id. arts. 5, 2o-21, at 18, 12o.
54. Normally, the governing law is that of the habitual residence of the decedent, though
some exceptions may apply. See id. art. 21, at 12o.
55. Id. art. 2o, at 12o ("Any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not
it is the law of a Member State.").
56. Id. art. 22 (1), at 12o (noting special rule for holders of multiple nationalities). Article
22 also describes various formalities regarding the choice of law. See id. art. 22 (2)-(4), at 12o.
57. Id. 4 , at iii.
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useful in cases involving trust arbitration, since it may minimize-if not
eliminate-the anti-autonomy bias reflected in some national laws.5
One important issue to consider is whether a U.S. national would have to
choose the law of the state in which he or she was born. At this point, most
questions involving trust arbitration have been decided as a matter of state
rather than federal law, and treatment can vary according to jurisdiction.59
According to the Regulation, the law referring to the nationality of the
decedent shall be the law of the territorial unit with the closest connection to
the decedent at death if the decedent is a national of a country (such as the
United States) with multiple territorial legal systems but no internal conflict
of laws rules regarding succession. 6° While this provision is relatively clear, it
can create some problems for estate planners, since the place with the closest
connection to the decedent at death cannot be determined until death
occurs.
The Regulation indicates that the governing law controls a wide variety
of issues, including "the causes, time and place of the opening of the
succession." 61 This language could be interpreted to include demands for
arbitration of trust-related disputes, as well as other types of non-judicial
dispute resolution (such as arbitration of wills and mediation of both trusts
and wills) that are outside the scope of the current Article. 62
E. CHoIcE OFFORUM
The Regulation also provides for autonomy with respect to choice of
forum, although, as Fabrizio Marongui Buonaiuti has stated, "the role of party
autonomy as regards the allocation of jurisdiction is conceived as strictly
58. See Galligan, supra note 28.
59. See Radford, supra note 14; Lee-ford Tritt, Legislative Approaches to Trust Arbitration in the
United States, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note i, at 15o, 165-71. Some commentators have suggested that the Federal Arbitration
Act covers trust arbitration, which would unify the treatment of trust arbitration in the United
States, but no court has weighed in on that issue yet. See David Horton, Donative Trusts and the
United States Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 2o3, 226-27.
6o. Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 3 6(2)(b), 2o12 O.J. 107, 124; Celia M. Caamifia
Dominguez, States with More Than One Legal System: Territorial Conflicts of Law, in THE EU
SUCCESSION REGULATION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 519, 521-29.
61. SeeCouncilRegulation 65o/2012, art. 23(2) (a), 2o12 O.J. at 12o-21.Article 23(2) also
identifies a number of substantive matters that could be resolved through arbitration or
mediation. See id. art. 23(2) (b)-(j), at 12o-2 1.
62. Arbitration of will disputes and mediation of both will and trust disputes have been
discussed as a matter of U.S. law. See Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More Than Money:
Mediation Clauses in Estate PlanningDocuments, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 539, 543 (2oo8) (discussing
mediation of will disputes); E. Gary Spitko, The Will as an Implied UnilateralArbitration Contract, 68
FLA. L. REV. 49, 53 (2016) (discussing will arbitration); Strong, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the
applicability of the Regulation to will arbitration); Dara Greene, Note, Antemortem Probate: A




complementary to the role it has been granted in respect of choice of law."63
As a result, the Regulation only permits a choice of forum within the E.U. and
requires any choice of forum to correlate to the law chosen by the decedent
under Article 22.64 The choice of forum is also limited by the fact that the
decision on where the matter is to be heard is not made directly by the
deceased (although the decedent has indirect control over such matters
through the choice of applicable law) but is instead made by "the parties
concerned" in a in a writing that has been signed and dated.65
This language initially suggests that trust arbitration may only be brought
with the consent of the parties 66 and that the trustee, rather than the settlor,
will likely be the motivating force behind the movement toward arbitration. 67
However, some jurisdictions may permit unilateral arbitration contracts,
which would avoid the problem. 6 Furthermore, it may still be possible for
testators to assert some "dead hand" pressure through an in terrorem clause or
conditional gift that requires beneficiaries to agree to arbitration in a post-
mortem writing,69 although it is unclear whether such a clause would survive
a challenge under the public policy provisions of the Regulation,70
particularly in those countries (such as Germany) where the decedent's
property passes automatically to the beneficiaries so as to avoid any period of
uncertainty about who owns title. 71
Another way of addressing the writing requirement under the Regulation
would be to have the concerned parties sign an antemortum choice of forum
63. Buonaiuti, supra note 26, at 149.
64. See Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 5, 2o12 OJ. at 118 (including various formalities
regarding the choice of forum).
65. Id. Commentators have characterized these provisions as "surprising" and noted that an
earlier proposal supported by the Max Plarick Institute for Comparative and International Law
would have allowed the testator to make a unilateral choice of court. See Orriella Feraci, Party
Autonomy and Conflict of Jurisdictions in the EU Private International Law on Family and Succession
Matters, 16 Y.B. PRIV. INT'L L. 105, 12 5-2 6 (2015).
66. Arbitration of trust disputes has long been permitted in the United States with the
consent of all parties. See David M. English, Arbitration and the United States Uniorm Trust Code, in
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i,
at 143, 143; Radford, supra note 14, at 176.
67. This approach has been adopted in some U.S. states. See English, supra note 66, at 146;
Strong, supra note 2, at 1188-91.
68. See Wustemarin & Huber, supra note 19, at 405-06; see also generally Peter Mankowski,
Erbrechtliche Schiedsgerichte in Flen mit Auslandsbezug und die EuErbVO, 2014 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
ERBRECIHT UND VERMOGENSVERWALTUNG 395 (discussing unilateral arbitration agreements and
trust arbitration under German law).
69. See Strong, Language, supra note 8, at 293-94, 298-99 (noting such provisions are risky
and may not be enforced); see also Spitko, supra note 62, at 49-50 (raising a challenge to "both
the understanding that a will is not a contract and the opposition to enforcement of testator-
compelled arbitration provisions that arises from that understanding").
70. See Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 35, 2012 OJ. (L 2o) 107, 124; infra notes
115-29 and accompanying text (discussing challenges under public policy provisions).
71. SeeGalligan, supra note 28, at 326-27.
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agreement containing an arbitration provision, since "there is no obstacle, in
principle, preventing the parties from entering into a choice-of-court
agreement, even before the opening of the succession."72 There are some
risks to this technique, including the choice of an ineligible forum73 and the
failure to join all the relevant parties, 74 but alert estate planners and trustees
should be able to overcome most, if not all, potential problems.75 A similar
technique would be to place an arbitration provision in or seek to establish
an arbitration agreement as a succession agreement, which is defined as "an
agreement, including an agreement resulting from mutual wills, which, with
or without consideration, creates, modifies or terminates rights to the future
estate or estates of one or more persons party to the agreement."76
When considering whether arbitration is permitted under Article 5 of the
Regulation, courts will likely focus on how the term "choice-of-court
agreement" is to be construed.77 Reliance on an argument by analogy to this
provision is necessary because the Regulation is silent as to the availability of
arbitration.7 However, the absence of any provision regarding arbitration is
not itself fatal, since the European Court ofJustice has been known to adopt
a teleological approach to the interpretation of legislative silence, as long as
72. See Buonaiuti, supra note 26, at 152.
73. Because the choice-of-court agreement only becomes effective after the opening of the
succession, the governing law cannot be confirmed until the moment of death. Thus, the
concerned parties could choose a forum based on an incorrect presumption about what the
governing law will be. See id.
74. Id. at 156. While it may not be possible to identify all interested parties prior to death
(for example, some creditors of the succession may not be fully identifiable until after death
occurs), some of those difficult-to-identify individuals may not be actual parties to the dispute
that arises. See Esperaiza Castellanos Ruiz, The Scope of the Applicable Law, in THE EU SUCCESSION
REGULATION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 351, 360 (defining the Regulation's "debts under
the succession," Council Regulation 650/2o 12, art. 23 (2) (g), 2 012 0.J. at 121, as "debts which
exist prior to the death of the deceased and the debts originated by the opening of the succession
itself, including taxes"). For example, creditors of the trust may be fully paid off by the trustee,
leaving only the beneficiaries to contest the disposition of the assets under the trust.
75. See Strong, supra note 2, at 1233-34.
76. Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 3 ()(b), 2o12 0.J. at 117. According to Article 25:
AM agreement as to succession ... shall be governed, as regards its admissibility, its
substantive validity and its binding effects between the parties.., by the law which,
under this Regulation, would have been applicable to the succession of that person
if he had died on the day on which the agreement was concluded.
Id. art. 25(1), at 121. Succession agreements may be used in the context of family businesses,
although statistics suggest that most transfers on death in Europe are controlled by wills rather than
succession agreements. See Susaria Navas Navarro, Freedom of Testation Versus Freedom to Enter into
Succession Agreements and Transaction Costs, in THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 6, at 1o5, 113.
77. SeeCouncil Regulation 65o/2012, art. 5, 2o12 0J. at i 18.
78. SeeWeller, supra iote 30, at 122.
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that technique does not result in an outcome that is contrary to the wording
of the instrument as a whole.79
As it turns out, support for a pro-arbitration interpretation can be found
in the terms of the Regulation itself. For example, the text states that
the term 'court' should [] be given a broad meaning so as to cover
not only courts in the true sense of the word, exercising judicial
functions, but also the notaries or registry offices in some Member
States who or which, in certain matters of succession, exercise
judicial functions like courts, and the notaries and legal
professionals who, in some Member States, exercise judicial
functions in a given succession by delegation of power by a court.S°
Weller interprets this language to mean that courts should not be
considered the exclusive means of resolving disputes involving succession law.
To the contrary,
any other authority or even a legal professional-this is a true novelty
in European private international law-with competence in
succession matters qualifies as a court as long as these bodies or
persons (a) exercise judicial functions or (b) act pursuant to
a delegation of power by a judicial authority or (c) act under
the control of a judicial authority. Further condition is that
(d) impartiality and (e) the right of all parties to be heard is
guaranteed. Finally, the decisions of such 'courts' must (f) be subject
to appeal or otherwise judicial review and (g) have a similar force
and effect as a decision of ajudicial authority on the same type of
matter.8s
Although Weller claims that "[i]t appears to be an open question
whether arbitral tribunals may count as 'courts,'s2 he also recognizes that
"[n]either 'arbitration' as such nor arbitration agreements are expressly
79. See Koen Lenaerts, The Court's Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal
Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice, in JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE 13, 2 2 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 20 13) (citing
Sturgeon and Others as interpreting regulatory silence in a manner that allowed consistency with
superior rules of European law, such as equal treatment); Albertina Albors Llorens, The European
Court ofJustice, More Than a Teleological Court, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGEYEARBOOK. OF EUROPEAN LEGAL
STUDIES 373, 393-94 (Alan Dashwood & Angela Ward eds., 1999) (discussing Schouten v.
Hoofdprodukstchap voor Akkerbouwprodkten [19771 E.C.R. 1291).
8o. CouncilRegulation, 650/2012, , ,2o12 OJ. (L 20) 107, 1o9;seealsoid. art. 3(2),at 117.
81. Weller, supra note 3o, at 122 (noting that "Member States are obliged to notify the
Commission of' the authorities that fall within the scope of this provision).
82. Id.; see also id. at 123 ("One may also hold that these jurisdictional rules do not apply
ratione materiae. Alternatively, one may take the view that arbitral tribunals are not meant to be
courts at all but that ESR implicitly establishes a fully mandatory system that excludes the
derogation of the jurisdiction of (Member) State courts." (footnote omitted)).
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excluded from the material scope of the [Regulation]."83 Certainly the first
set of criteria regarding the need to "exercise judicial functions ... act
pursuant to a delegation of power by ajudicial authority or... act under the
control of a judicial authority" are easily met by arbitration, which is subject
to legislative andjudicial control and provides final, binding awards pursuant
to ajurisdictional grant of authority from the state. 84
Weller also writes that "[a]rbitral tribunals will regularly fulfill the
procedural minimum standards" described in Article 3(2) of the
Regulation.5 This, too, appears indisputable, although some concerns might
be raised as to whether awards are capable of being "made the subject of an
appeal to or review by ajudicial authority." 6 However, this argument does not
carry much weight, since arbitral awards are currently subject to judicial
review, albeit of a limited procedural nature, and are considered final and
binding to the same extent as judicial decisions. 87 Even if an appeal on the
merits is required under the Regulation, arbitration can provide a suitable
mechanism through arbitral appeals, since several arbitral organizations offer
specialized rules for arbitral appeals, including the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"), which also offers specialized rules for will and trust
arbitration. 8 Furthermore, some jurisdictions, most notably England, offer
judicial review of the merits of an arbitral award9
83. Id. at 122-23 (comparing Article 1.2(d) of the Brussels I Recast and Article 1.2(e)
of Rome I).
84. Id.; see also JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 71-82 (2003) (discussing theoretical basis of arbitration); SI. Strong, Discovery
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International
Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN.J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 323-50 (2013) (discussing jurisdictional
grants). Arbitrators are capable of wielding the same powers as a judge in trust arbitration. See
Trustee (Amendment) Act, 2o1 § 18 (Bah.) (inserting § 9 1B(2) into the Bahamas Trustee Act
1998 to provide arbitrators with "all the powers of [a] Court"); Strong, supra note 2, at 12o4-o8
(discussing U.S. law).
85. Weller, supra note 30, at 123; see also Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 3(2),
2o12 O.J. at 117.
86. Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 3(2)(a), 2o12 OJ. at 117.
87. SeeLEWETAL., supra note 84, at 627.
88. See SI. Strong, Institutional Approaches to Trust Arbitration: Comparing the AAA, ACTEC, ICC,
and DIS Trust Arbitration Regimes, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 99, 1o-o2 (discussing different arbitral rules on wills and
trusts); SI. Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing and Exceeding the
Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1, 17-18 (2015) (discussing arbitral appeals




Arbitration%2oRules.pdf (highlighting the requirements, process, and effect of appellate
arbitration); AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES (2oo9), https://
www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Wills% 2oand% 2oTrusts% 2oArbitration% 2 oRules% 2oJun% 2oo1
%2C%2o2oo9.pdf (providing procedure for arbitration of trusts and wills).
89. SeeArbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 69 (Eng.).
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Weller has some questions about the seat of the arbitration. He believes
it would be "strange" if arbitral tribunals were restricted by the Regulation's
rules on jurisdiction such that an arbitration could only proceed in locations
described in Chapter II of the Regulation.9-
Buonaiuti makes a similar observation in his discussion of out-of-court
settlements, suggesting that
an out-of-court settlement by definition takes place outside the
purview of the courts. The place where such a settlement is
concluded is therefore hardly relevant in terms of forum. The place
where an out-of-court settlement is actually concluded would come
up for consideration, in terms of the applicable law, only in respect
of issues related to its formal validity.91
Buonaiuti's conclusion seems equally applicable to arbitration, which
frequently operates on a transnational basis. Indeed, Buonaiuti has even
suggested that amicable out-of-court settlements (defined in Article 3 (1) (h)
as "a settlement in a matter of succession which has been approved by a court
or concluded before a court in the course of proceedings") could include
arbitration agreements under the Regulation.92 Under this approach,
arbitration of a matter that falls within the scope of the Regulation need not
take place in the place contemplated by the governing law.
This perspective has a number of benefits, not the least of which is that
allowing the arbitration to take place at a location determined by the
concerned parties may increase the likelihood that those parties will sign an
arbitration agreement, since the seat can be made in a place that is more
convenient to them. Furthermore, this technique respects the substantive
concerns of the Regulation's drafters, since, as Weller notes, even "[i]f the
90. Weller, supra note 30, at 123. Chapter II of the Regulation deals with questions of
jurisdiction. SeeCouncil Regulation 650/2012, arts. 4-19, 2012 0.J. at 1 18-2o.
91. Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Closing of Own-Motion Proceedings in the Event of a Choice of
Law, in THE EU SUCCESSION REGULATION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 77, 1 78.
92. Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 3 () (h), 2o12 0.J. at 117; see also Buonaiuti, supra
note 91, at 177 n. 1 (expressing some skepticism on the issue and ioting split in German
commentary). Out-of-court settlements are discussed throughout the Regulation. See, e.g.,
Council Regulation 65o/2012, 29,36, arts. 3(1) (h), 61, 2o12 0J. 107,110-11,117-18, 128.
Notably, Paragraph 43 states that certain actions "should be without prejudice to any choice made
by the parties to settle the succession amicably out of court in another Member State where this
is possible under the law of that Member State," which appears to support Buonaiuti's view that
out-of-court settlements are not restricted by choice of forum agreements. See id. 43, at 111; see
also id. 29, at i io ("Where succession proceedings are not opened by a court of its own motion,
this Regulation should not prevent the parties from settling the succession amicably out of court,
for instance before a notary, in a Member State of their choice where this is possible under the
law of that Member State. This should be the case even if the law applicable to the succession is
not the law of that Member State.").
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[Regulation] allows derogation in favour of arbitration it will presumably
require the arbitral tribunal to apply the [Regulation's] choice-of-law rules."93
Because "[a]rbitrability will be a matter of the applicable national law,"
Weller believes, with others, that the state whose law has been chosen to
govern by the Regulation will retain control over the question of whether and
to what extent trust arbitration will be permitted.94 While this outcome is by
no means assured, given a certain amount of confusion relating to the law
governing questions of arbitrability, Gary Born has argued that questions
relating to arbitrability are often best resolved by reference to the law
governing the substantive dispute, at least if that law promotes arbitration
rather than restricts it.95
At this point, it is somewhat unclear whether trust arbitration is governed
by substantive trust law (which will likely "travel" with the governing law) as
opposed to procedural law (which will likely not travel outside the territory of
the forum). All existing legislation on trust arbitration appears within the
relevant trust code, which initially suggests that the provisions will travel.96
However, some jurisdictions (namely the Bahamas, Paraguay, Florida, Idaho,
and South Dakota) also refer to the national or local arbitration law, which
suggests trust arbitration may only be allowed within the territory in
question.97
93. Weller, supra note 30, at 123. Although conflict of laws analyses can be complicated in
international arbitration, it appears likely that this conclusion is correct. See GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2643-61 (2d ed. 2014).
94. Weller, supra note 30, at 123; see also Wistenarin & Huber, supra note 19, at 4oo. The
question of whether and to what extent trust disputes are arbitrable varies according to
jurisdiction. See Strong, Arbitrability, supra note 8, at 6o4-12; Strong, supra note 2, at 1236-44.
95. See BORN, supra note 93, at 604 (ioting exceptions). Courts enforcing arbitral awards
under the New York Convention may also look at arbitrability from their own perspective. See New
York Convention, supra note 20, art. V(2) (a).
96. The proposed New Zealand law is the exception to the rule, since the bill suggests placing
the trust arbitration provision in New Zealand's arbitration law, which strongly suggests that the
provision would not travel. See Arbitration Amendment Bill 2017 (explanatory note) (N.Z.).
97. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (2) (West 2017); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-8-ioi, 15-8-103
(2oo9); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-54 (Supp. 2017); Trustee (Amendment) Act, 2o1 § 18
(Bah.) (inserting § 9 1A(2) into the Trustee Act of 1998); Arbitration Act, 2009 § 4(1) (Bah.);
Brownbill, supra note 15, at 324. The UTC is somewhat ambiguous on this issue. See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 11 I (UNIF. LAW COMM'N amended 2OO). The Paraguayan provision is found in article
44 of Law 921 entitled "Negocios Fiduciarios" and reads:
Ei el acto constitutivo podrd estipularse que los conflictos surgidos entre el
fideicomitente y el fiduciario o el berieficiario, segurn el caso, por raz6n de la
existencia, interpretaci6n, desarrollo o ternIinaci6n del negocio fiduciario se
sometan a la decision de drbitros. A estos efectos, en el acto constitutivo del negocio
fiduciario se determiinardn expresamente las normas sustaitivas y adjetivas a que se
someterd la soluci6n arbitral y, en su defecto, se aplicardn las normas que en materia
arbitral establece la ley.
This provision can be translated as:
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Similar concerns would also arise in cases where trust arbitration has
been authorized by a judicial decision, since courts cannot exercise their
powers extraterritorially.98 Other jurisdictions (namely Panama, Arizona,
Missouri, New Hampshire, and Washington) do not refer to the relevant
arbitration statutes in their trust arbitration provisions, thereby suggesting
that the arbitrability of trust disputes will travel with the substantive law.99
Guernsey goes even further and indicates that its provision on trust arbitration
applies regardless of where the proceedings take place.1° °
The Regulation has other positive attributes, including a mechanism by
which the courts can respect an arbitration agreement. According to Article
6, courts of the Member State where the decedent was habitually resident may
decline jurisdiction if the decedent has chosen to have the law of his or her
nationality govern the succession, thereby allowing the court whose law has
been chosen to accept the matter.1° This provision could also be used to
decline jurisdiction in cases involving an arbitration agreement. Indeed, the
In the deed it can be stipulated that conflicts arising between the trustee
(fideicomitente) and the fiduciario or beneficiary, as the case may be, involving the
existence, interpretation, administration or termination of the business trust may be
submitted to the decision of arbitrators. Consequently, the deed creating the
business trust will expressly set out the substantive norms and corollary matters
which shall be submitted to an arbitral resolution and, in the absence of such
provisions, the norms established in the arbitral law will be applied.
L. 921 De Negocios Fiduciarios, 11 Julio, 1996 art. 44 (Para.) (available at http://
www.avalori.com.py/downloads/Ley-92 i-deNegocios Fiduciarios.pdf) (translation by author).
98. SeeRachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3 d 840, 842 (Tex. 2o13) (referring to the Texas Arbitration
Act); Fitzpatrick vEmerald Grain Pty. Ltd. [2o171 WASC 2o6, at [9o]-[91], [99] (Austl.) (allowing
arbitration of trust disputes even over the objection of one of the parties); Rinehart v Welker [2o 121
NSWCA 95, at [1731-[1771 (Court ofAppeal NSW) (Austl.) (Bathurst, CJ.) (allowing arbitration
of trust dispute when all the parties and beneficiaries agreed).
99. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2o12); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.2-205.1 (West
2017); N.H. REV. STAr. ANN. § 5 64 -B:i-iii (West 2o18); WASH. REV. CODE §§ ii.96A.oio,
1 i.96A.o3o (2o16). The Panamanian provision is found in the second paragraph of Article 41
of Law i of 1984, and reads, "Podra establecerse en el instrumento de fideicomiso que cualquier
controversia que surja del fideicomiso sera resuelta por arbitros o arbitradores, asi como el
procedimiento a que ellos deban sujetarse." ("It can be established in the trust that whatever
controversy that arises regarding the trust may be resolved by arbitrators, as well as the procedure
that the arbitrators should adopt." (translation by author)). See Ley 1 de Enero de 1984 (Pan.),
http://ima.gob.pa/wp-coriteit/uploads/2015/o9/LEY-i-de- 5 -DE-ENERO-DE-i 9 8 4 .pdf. "Porla
cual se regula el Fideicomiso en Panama y se adoptan otras disposiciones." ("By which the trust
in Panama is regulated and other dispositions are adopted." (translation by author)). Id.
100. SeeThe Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, § 63 (allowing for arbitration, mediation and other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in cases involving "breach of trust" and stating "[f] or
the avoidance of doubt, the ADR proceedings need not be conducted in Guernsey or in
accordance with the procedural law of Guernsey").
101. SeeCouncil Regulation 65o/2012, 35, arts. 6, 17, 2o12 0.J. (L 201) 107, 11o, u18,
120 (noting a lis pendens rule under the Regulation); Torrie, supra note 5o, at 422 (noting the
Regulation's approach is based on the Brussels I Regulation).
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New York Convention would appear to require courts to respect arbitration
provisions regarding trust disputes as a matter of international law.102
F. RECOGNITION
The Regulation also provides for recognition and enforcement of
decisions from E.U. Member States relating to succession matters.1 °3
Although Weller believes that "[r] ecognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award will not fall within chapter IV of the [Regulation],"1°4 the Regulation
does provide a similarly simple mechanism for enforcement of arbitral awards
arising out of trust arbitration: Article 75, which states that "[the] Regulation
shall not affect the application of international conventions to which one or
more Member States are party at the time of adoption of [the] Regulation."1°5
All of the Member States of the E.U. are currently signatories of the NewYork
Convention, which provides a predictable and well-established means of
recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards.1°6 In fact, the New York
Convention provides additional support for arbitration of disputes falling
within the scope of the Regulation, given mandatory language in the New
York Convention that
[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.107
While there is no case yet confirming that the New York Convention
applies to trusts, numerous commentators have supported that position.1os
One of the biggest potential obstacles to trust arbitration involves the need
102. See New York Convention, supra note 2o, art. III; Moses, supra note 2o, at 493.
103. SeeCouncil Regulation 650/2012, 39-58, 2o12 O.J. at 111-13.
104. Weller, supra note 30, at 123. Chapter IV of the Regulation deals with recognition and
enforcement of decisions on succession issues. See Council Regulation 650/2012, arts. 39-58,
2o12 O.J. at 124-27.
105. Council Regulation 650/2012, art. 75(1), 2o12 o.J. at 132; seealso id. 73, at 115. Butsee
id. art. 75 (2), at 132 (giving precedence to the Regulation in matters involving two Member States).
io6. See New York Convention, supra note 2o, art. III; see also Status: Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON INT'L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/
arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2o18) [hereinafter New York
Convention Status] (listing Contracting Parties, which includes the United States).
107. SeeNewYork Convention, supra note 2o, art. 11(i).
io8. See Ganz, supra note 2o, at 494-95; Moses, supra note 2o, at 493; Strong, supra note 2,
at 1213-19; Wistemann & Huber, supra note 19, at 405-06.
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for a writing under Article II (2) of the Conventionl19 but that requirement
also exists under the Regulation and can be met through a variety of means.110
Some questions may arise whether the NewYork Convention would apply
to matters arising under the Regulation, given that some states have indicated
that the Convention applies only to commercial matters and succession law
may in some cases be considered to fall within family rather than commercial
law.111 Commentators considering this issue in the context of trust arbitration
have concluded that many jurisdictions use a sufficiently broad definition of
commerciality that would include trust-related concerns.112 A similar
determination appears appropriate in cases falling under the Regulation,
given that the Regulation excludes matters that are quintessentially associated
with family law, such as those relating to "the status of natural persons, as well
as family relationships and relationships deemed by the law applicable to such
relationships to have comparable effects"' 113 and routinely refers to economic
and social considerations every time family issues are noted. 114
G. PUBLIC POLICY
Although the decision to proceed in arbitration is most often considered
a choice of forum rather than a choice of law, the two concepts are linked
under the Regulation.115 Because all existing laws authorizing trust arbitration
are found in trust codes, any attempt to adopt trust arbitration could be
framed in terms of a choice of law as much as a choice of forum. Considering
the connection between choice of law and trust arbitration is important
because Article 35 states that "[t] he application of a provision of the law of
any State specified by this Regulation may be refused" by a court with
jurisdiction over the matter. 6 Although the choice of law should be denied
"only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
(ordre public) of the forum,"117 the trust bench and bar have traditionally
1O9. New York Convention, supra note 20, art. 11(2).
110. See Council Regulation 650/2012, art. 5, 2012 O.J. at 118; Strong, supra note 2,
at 12o8-18; Wfustemaln & Huber, supra note 19, at 405-06; see also supra notes 63-1o2 and
accompanying text (discussing choice of forum and how to address the writing requirement).
111. See New York Convention, supra note 20, art. 1(3); Pataut, supra note 7, at 1O9
(suggesting succession law is a mix of several disciplines); New York Convention Status, supra note
1 o6 (indicating states that have made the commercial declaration).
112. See Ganz, supra note 20, at 498-500; Moses, supra note 20, at 492-93; Strong,
supra note 2, at 1186.
113. Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 1(2) (a), 2o12 0J. at i16.
114. See id. 54, at 1 13; see also id. 24, at 1o9.
115. See id. art. 22, at 12o; see also supra Parts IIhD., 111.1E.




evinced a somewhat hostile attitude towards arbitration, suggesting that some
jurisdictions may seek to bar trust arbitration based on Article 35.118
Interestingly, any attempt to preclude trust arbitration under Article 35
may need to rely on ordrepublic rather than public policy, since,
[i] n the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, the meaning of "public policy"
is relatively narrow, referring to "matters of public morals, health,
safety, welfare, and the like" and is distinguishable from matters
related to due process. In the continental European tradition public
policy, or ordre public, refers to a wider range of judicial concerns, a
range that "encompasses breaches of procedural justice."119
At this point, it is unclear what procedural objections might be made,
since neither the Regulation nor the commentators discussing Article 35 have
identified any specific concerns that might create difficulties for trust
arbitration.12 However, one possibility might involve the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("European Charter").121 Article
47 of the European Charter recognizes the right to a public trial in language
that is somewhat analogous to that used in Article 6.1 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention") ,122 and some commentators have questioned
1 18. See Strong, supra note 2, at 1 162 n.i6 (discussing the "blinding prejudice" of some
members of the succession law community toward arbitration (quoting AM. COLL. OF TR.
& ESTATE COUNSEL, ARBITRATION TASK FORCE REPORT 5 (20oo6), https://www.mribar.org/
docs/default-source/sections/actec-arbitratiori-task-force-report.pdf)).
119. Fernando Mantilla-Serrarto, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy, 20 ARB.
INT'L 333, 334 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
120. See Council Regulation 65o/2012, art. 35, 2012 0.J. at i 1o; Bonomi, supra note 33, at
36-38; Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Limitation of Proceedings, in THE EU SUCCESSION
REGULATION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 20o9, 217; Gianluca Contaldi & Cristina Grieco,
Public Policy (ordrepublic), in THE EU SUCCESSION REGULATION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at
505, 512-13 (claiming other public policy concerns might include situations "where the
governing law contains provisions that are discriminatory"). However, the perception of
arbitration does not always match reality. See SI. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky
Defaults, Status Quo Bias and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of International
Arbitration, 20o18 U. ILL. L. REV. 533,533-34-
121. SeeCouncil Regulation 65o/2012, 58, 81, 20o12 0.J. 107, 113, 116; see also Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2012 o.J. (C 326) 391, 405 ("Everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal previously established by law.").
122. Article 6.i states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
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whether Article 6.1 precludes trust arbitration on the grounds that the
European Convention guarantees parties the right to a public trial.123 While
that argument has been raised in various contexts over the years, a wide variety
of courts have held that arbitration is indeed consistent with the European
Convention.124 As a result, objections to trust arbitration based on Article 47
of the European Charter will likely be equally unavailing, as long as the parties
can be found to have consented to arbitration in some manner.1 2 5
Although arbitration is not generally incompatible with the European
Charter or the European Convention, certain types of procedures may
nevertheless be barred as being procedurally unfair.12 6 One issue that may
arise under the Regulation involves language stating that "[t]he rights of heirs
and legatees, of other persons close to the deceased and of creditors of the
succession must be effectively guaranteed."127 At this point, it is unclear
whether and to what extent courts will consider arbitration to be considered
sufficiently protective of the rights of the designated class of persons,
particularly if some of those persons are unborn or unascertained at the time
a choice of forum agreement is signed. 12 However, those matters can and
likely should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.129
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice.
European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights art. 6.1 (2OO),
www.echr.coe.int/Documetts/CotvetifionENG.pdf.
123. See Mark Herbert, Trust Arbitration in England and Wales: The Trust Law Committee, in
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i,
at 228, 246-52.
124. SeeEuropean Court of Human Rights, supra note i22; Tabbane v. Switzerland 41069/12
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2o16); Stretford v. The Football Association Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 238, [451
(Eng.); LEW ETAL., supra note 84, 5-57 to 5-67 (discussing cases); Adam Samuel, Arbitration,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Generally and the European Convention on Human Rights,
2 1J. INT'LARB. 413,416-19, 426-33 (2004) (stating that parties consenting to arbitration waive
their rights under Article 6 (1) of the European Convention); Press Release, European Court of
Human Rights, The Impossibility of Appealing Against a Verdict Issued by the International
Court of Arbitration Was Not in Breach of the Convention (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.humanrights.ch/upload/pdf/ 160324_EntscheidTabbane v. Switzerland_-_challenge
to the resolution of a dispute by-theInternational Court of Arbitration.pdf.
125. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 326/2012, art. 47,
2o12 0J. at 405.
126. See id.; European Court of Human Rights, supra note 122.
127. Council Regulation 65o/2012, 7, 2012 OJ. (L 2O) 107; see also Ruiz, supra note 74
("[D] ebts under the succession" under Article 23.2 (g) means "debts which exist prior to the death
of the deceased and the debts originated by the opening of the succession itself, including taxes.").
128. SeeStrong, supra note 2, at i21o-11.





The increasing interest in trust arbitration suggests that it is only a matter
of time before the viability of a trust arbitration provision is considered under
the Regulation. When that issue is raised, courts will doubtless need to parse
the specific provisions discussed above. However, it will also be important to
remember that arbitration fulfills one of the major goals of the Regulation,
namely predictability in estate planning, particularly in cases that involve
persons or property located outside the E.U.13o or that involve a variety of
trust-related disputes, some of which fall within the terms of the Regulation
and some of which do not. Arbitration not only allows the consolidation of all
matters and all parties into a single forum (thereby making the process more
time- and cost-efficient and avoiding the possibility of inconsistent outcomes),
it also allows the parties to ensure that the decision-making body has
competence in the governing law or laws, since an arbitral tribunal can
include experts in several different laws, particularly laws of countries other
than European Member States.131 This flexibility in expertise is particularly
important because some trust-related matters could involve different laws
governing different aspects of the disputes, and the Regulation values
techniques that unify the substantive competence of the adjudicator and the
law governing the issue. 132 Thus, arbitration can be said to fulfill the purposes
of the Regulation better than litigation in some cases.
Arbitration also promotes autonomy, another clear goal of the
Regulation with respect to both substantive matters (as illustrated by
provisions allowing for choice of law) and procedural matters (as illustrated
by provisions allowing for choice of forum, out-of-court settlements and
succession agreements).133 Support for succession agreements and out-of-
130. See Lein, supra note 6, at 111.
13 1. For example, if a trust dispute was to be governed in part by English law and in part by
French law, the tribunal could include one arbitrator who was an expert in English law and one
who was an expert in French law, something that would be impossible to do in thejudicial setting.
132. For example, questions regarding the devolution of beneficiary shares could be subject
to the law chosen by the testator, pursuant to the Regulation, while questions relating to the
validity of the trust could be subject to a different law, pursuant to different conflict of laws rules.
SeeWeller, supra note 37, at 103-04; see also Lein, supra note 6, at 139-40 (distinguishing the law
concerning a trust and the law concerning a will that creates a testamentary trust).
133. See Council Regulation 650/2012, arts. 5-8, 22, 25, 2012 OJ. (L 201) 107, 118,
12o-21; see also supra notes 50-1o2 and accompanying text. A succession agreement (or, more
properly, an "agreement as to succession") is defined as "an agreement, including an agreement
resulting from mutual wills, which, with or without consideration, creates, modifies or terminates
rights to the future estate or estates of one or more persons party to the agreement." Council
Regulation 650/2o12, art. 3 () (b), 2o12 OJ. at 117. E.U. Member States currently contemplate
a variety of types of succession agreements. See Bonomi, supra note 33, at 34. Succession or
inheritance agreements made prior to death are occasionally used in the United States. See
Michael W. Galligan, International Estate Planning for U.S. Citizens: An Integrated Approach, 36 EST.
PLAN. 11, 15 (2oo9). Some of these agreements may be mediated rather than negotiated. See
Greene, supra note 62, at 679-8o.
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court settlements is particularly noteworthy, since it is unclear why procedural
autonomy should prevail in matters involving negotiation or mediation but
not arbitration. While it is true that such settlements require the approval of
a court before they can be considered binding, the only time a court can deny
cross-border enforcement is if the "settlement is manifestly contrary to public
policy (ordre public) in the Member State of enforcement." 134 Arbitral awards
are similarly subject to non-enforcement on public policy grounds, both
domestically and internationally, so arbitration should be considered on par
with negotiation and mediation under the Regulation.135
While it is unfortunate that the drafters of the Regulation did not
explicitly consider arbitration, such an omission is understandable given the
complexity of the issues reflected in the Regulation. Hopefully this Article has
shed some light on how trust arbitration can and should be considered by
courts when the time comes.
134. Council Regulation 650/2012, art. 61(3), 2o12 0J. at 128. The Regulation is silent as
to the grounds for non-recognition of a settlement agreement, which suggests the matter is
decided under the national law of place where the agreement is made. See id. art. 8, at i 18; see
also id. 29, at i 1o ("Where succession proceedings are not opened by a court of its own motion,
this Regulation should not prevent the parties from settling the succession amicably out of court,
for instance before a notary, in a Member State of their choice where this is possible under the
law of that Member State. This should be the case even if the law applicable to the succession is
not the law of that Member State.").
135. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 20, art. V; U.N. Comm''n on Int'l Trade Law,
Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, arts. 34-35 (Dec. 11, 1985), revised in 2oo6, G.A. Res. 61/33,
U.N. Doc. A/61/33 (Dec. 4, 2006), (available at http://www.uicitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration /ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf).
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